Volume 12

Issue 4

Article 1

12-31-2010

The backbone of European corporate governance standards after
financial crisis, corporate scandals and manipulation
Dinh Tran Ngoc Huy
Dinh Tran Ngoc Hien

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.ebrjournal.net/home

Recommended Citation
Huy, D., & Hien, D. (2010). The backbone of European corporate governance standards after financial
crisis, corporate scandals and manipulation. Economic and Business Review, 12(4). https://doi.org/
10.15458/2335-4216.1254

This Original Article is brought to you for free and open access by Economic and Business Review. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Economic and Business Review by an authorized editor of Economic and Business
Review.

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 12 | No. 4 | 2010 | 215–240

215

THE BACKBONE OF EUROPEAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS
AFTER FINANCIAL CRISIS, CORPORATE
SCANDALS AND MANIPULATION
DINH TRAN NGOC HUY*
DINH TRAN NGOC HIEN**

ABSTRACT: The paper concentrates on several comparative standards in Europe, so-called
a limited European set of standards on corporate governance.
First, it looks at some groups of findings on corporate governance subjects in the post-crisis
period. It found out that companies in these periods need to oversight their legal or compliance activities, besides suitable policies.
Second, it identified different points in latest corporate governance standard principles
and systems in five (5) countries in European region: Germany, The UK, Denmark, Sweden
and France.
Third, this paper provide with a summary of evaluation of current corporate governance
systems in these above countries which may enable relevant organizations in re-evaluating
their current ones.
Last but not least, it aims to illustrate a limited comparative set of standards of European
corporate governance, so-called backbone, and give proper recommendations to relevant
governments and institutions.
Key Words: corporate governance standards, board structure, code of best practice, financial crisis, corporate scandals, market manipulation, internal audit
JEL Classification: M00: G01; G3

1. INTRODUCTION
The Danish 2010 Recommendation of Corporate Governance mentioned after financial
crisis, there comes to a need to look at shareholders’ and institutional shareholders’ roles
and rights. The Exhibit 1 shows us that recently there have been many changes in defining
and controlling conflicts of interests, as well as clarifications of independence. In the light
of different views on Corporate Governance and Company Acts, which are among interests
* School of Business, Eastern International University, Binh Duong, Viet Nam
** University of Technology, Ho Chi Minh, Viet Nam
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of many organizations, after financial crisis 2007-2009, this paper mainly concentrates on
analysis of Code of Best Practices for Corporate Governance in selected European countries and separates it from the analysis of relevant Company Act and Accounting regulations, which can be used as reference for further scopes. Despite of trying to select an easyreading writing style, there is still some academic words need to be explained in further.
This paper is organized as following. First (1st) session is Research literature review,
which gives us a summary of what has been done in this field. Next, second (2nd) session
provides some theories in corporate governance and manipulation. The third (3rd) session handles with empirical research findings and performing a comparative analysis
among different Codes.
And final (4th) session turns to the conclusion and policy suggestion. Last but not least,
a reference and web resources are introduced for further research and analysis. At last,
there are exhibit session which covers some summary of this paper’s analysis and comparison. And a glossary notes is provided with information for reference.

2. RESEARCH LITERATURE REVIEW
Many researches so far are done in the corporate governance area in Europe. Hopt, Klaus
J., and Leyens, Patrick C., (2004) pointed recent development trend in Europe Corporate
Governance is specialized rules for listed companies and indicate growing convergence
in internal control mechanisms independent of board structure. EU (2002) also issues
the Code of Best practices and the 2006 Directive requires that each listed company
should publish an annual corporate governance statement to what extent the company
can comply with that code. Among its key principles is the separation of roles between
the CEO and the Chairman as it stated “The Chairman and CEO roles should be separate
and the CEO should not immediately become Chairman of either a unitary or a supervisory board”. Noia, Carmine Di., (2009) at ECIIA Conference shows after the crisis 2009
in Europe, there is no definition of shareholder due to national jealousy of company law;
no harmonization of record date; and no shareholder identification. And OECD (2009)
confirmed that the financial crisis can be an attribute to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance system, including risk management system and executives salaries.
After crisis 2007-2008, Erkens, David., Hung, Mingyi., and Matos, Pedro., (2010), found
out that during crisis, firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital,
which partially caused them to experience worse stock returns. Last but not least, AFG
2010 Corporate Governance (CG) Code, France, stated the European code should be
completed so that basic CG guidelines were defined to encourage best CG practices in
every field for all listed companies in European Economic Area. Furthermore, Exhibit 6
shows us different parties and components, internal and external, should be involved in
a policy or system of corporate governance.
But, what is the backbone of European corporate governance standards?
Theory of Corporate Governance, Scandal and Market Manipulation
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Theory of manipulation
Different ownership structure affects manipulation. In dispered ownership regime,
manager may have incentives to do some stock market manipulation. Baik, Bok., Billing,
Bruce K., and Morton, Richard M., (2005) expressed SEC’ concerns that managers can
manipulate non-GAAP measures to mislead investors.
Theory of corporate governance and financial crisis
After the financial crisis 1998 and G7 meeting, World Bank said corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its
shareholders and its stakeholders. Moreover, it is only part of the larger economic
context such as macroeconomic policies and the degree of competition in product
markets. The UK Financial Reporting Council (2010) stated corporate governance
is about what the board of a company does and how it sets the values of the company, and is to be distinguished from the day to day operational management of
the company by full-time executives. We can see, therefore, different approaches on
corporate governance.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
First of all, we perform a comparative analysis of European corporate governance principles in each of two (2) different groups including: 1) European representative Corporate Governance group, here, we select two countries: The UK and Germany which have
many modifications in their history of issuing corporate governance principles; and 2)
Relatively good Corporate governance group including Sweden, Denmark and France;
We also use international standards of corporate governance for reference such as: ADB
and OECD’s corporate governance principles as reference.
After that, we make a suggestion on what so-called common corporate governance principles for Europe which is aiming to create a basic background for relevant corporations
interesting in corporate governance subject. Additionally, it can be considered as the
recommendation to relevant countries’ government and other relevant organizations for
public policy and necessary evaluation. For a summary of our standards, see Exhibit sessions and the below table D.3.

4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A-

Findings on Corporate governance issues after financial crisis, corporate scandals and market manipulation
There are several popular issues including: the appraisal of following code of ethics
of the company and industry in specific markets is not done with full of responsibility or is done just on the business surface. Or in another words, there still lacks
of the appraisal of the role of the legal division in the company which contributes
to the bad results on the corporate performance and scandals.
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We can point it out another CG issue. It is, the internal and external committee audit showed disadvantages and weak points during the audit process which lead to
rooms for managers using manipulation tools to create an unreal financial picture
of scandal companies.
Continuously, there is an issue of legal and compliance with international accounting standards which is being used improperly by companys executives. In another
word, it points a failure in the internal control system of the corporation. Also,
there involves a matter of a sound process for decision-making which fails in some
cases.
B-

Findings on Ways of Manipulation during Corporate Scandals
Several Manipulation Techniques found out during corporate scandals involve, but
not limited to:
B.1 - The manipulation techniques in the income statement:
Here, the managers of company use accounting practice to transfer some profit
that over shareholder’s expectation to the next fiscal year. Or the company’s revenues are recorded when the company is not completing all services committed.
B.2 - The manipulation techniques in both the income statement and balance sheet:
The corporation in this case tends to use more debt than equity when the positive
Net Present Value (NPV) of its projects arises. Or Lehman Brothers (2008) is accused of using another company, Hudson Castle, for its accounting manipulation
which means transferring its asset and risks.
B.3 - The manipulation techniques relevant to international accounting practice code:
We can see two (2) below different popular accounting rules on treatment “impairment” term which may mislead the company.
In IFRs: Impairment is recorded when an asset’s carrying amount exceeds the
higher of the asset’s value-in-use (discounted present value of the asset’s expected
future cash flows) and fair value less costs to sell.
And in GAAPs: Impairment is recorded when an asset’s carrying amount exceeds
the expected future cash flows to be derived from the asset on an undiscounted
basis.
B.4 - Other manipulation techniques net belong to above classifications:
Manipulation can happen when the individual or company sells share when the
price is high and buy back when low price to maximize the return.
C-

Actions on Preventing or Controlling negative manipulation
Necessary actions to prevent or control negative market manipulation are, but not
limited to, periodically re-evaluation of Code of Best Practices, reviewing reports
of corporate governance and enhance internal system and mechanisms.

D - Findings on Construction of a Limited Common European Corporate Governance standards
These findings will be shown in a detailed analysis of a model indicated in the later
sessions.
D.1 - Group 1 – Europe representative corporate governance standards analysis
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In The UK
It is said that The UK Code of Corporate Governance has affected the US principles in
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA) 2002. The Code is modified and reviewed several times since
its first version in 1992, and up to now the latest modification is from the combined Code
2008 to the Code 2010. Its goal is to enhance the effective and prudent management to
deliver long term success and its role is critical in guiding UK corporations toward a
sustainable business.
One of its main characteristics is enhancing the roles of shareholders in appointing directors and auditors. Also, it pays attention roles of the 2nd party in any business, the
board of directors, especially in the leadership role.
Among its advantages include the interaction between the Chairmen and the company’s
investors which is encouraged to increase transparency. And it stated the leadership role
of the Chairmen in leading the Board effectively.
It is a good point in the Code that the board’s decision should not be taken by individual
or small group. Especially, the 2010 Code emphasizes the role of the Chairmen, compared to and more than, the CEO. Different from most of Asian Codes, there is a job
specification for Chairman appointed by nomination committee.
Besides, one of its distinguished features is to describe the features of the annual report
with “comply and explain” requirements, for example, the number of meetings of board
and its committee and director’s attendance.
On the other sides, it still needs to clearly identify several matters such as: the basic and
advanced rights of shareholders, the clear border among leadership roles of The Chair,
The CEO and The Board, the sufficient size of the Board. Also still there is a matter of
how the chairman realizes the strengths and weaknesses of the board.
In general, the 2010 Code has a “comply and explain” style with the attention paid to the
way the Code is built itself. In addition to, it also functions as the helpful guidelines for
the relevant companies to take into action. And it suggests additional part to cover in the
Code relevant to institutional shareholder treatments. For more information such as key
overlaps between the 2010 Code and other disclosure rules, please see Exhibit 8.
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TABLE C.0 – The UK Corporate Governance general standards (a short summary
evaluation)
Subjects or
parties

Main quality factors Sub quality factors

Responsibilities

Objectives

Note

Audit
committee

At least three
independent nonexecutive directors

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Monitor effectiveness of internal audit and
integrity of financial report; review internal
financial controls and external auditor’s
independence; recommend to board to
remove or reappoint external auditor

Monitor objectivity
and effectiveness
of audit process,
with relevant UK
regulations;

Two members in
small co

Nomination
committee

Majority of
independent nonexecutive directors

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

evaluate the balance of skills, experience,
independence and knowledge on the
board; process to nominate board;
appointment of chairman;

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Compensation
or
Remuneration
committee

At least three
independent nonexecutive directors
(might involve
chairman)

Avoid rewarding
poor performance;
Avoid pay more than
necessary

Judge where to position their co compared
to others;

Sufficient Numeration Two members in
small co
levels to attract,
retain and motivate
directors

CEO

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Should not go on to be
chairmen

Support the Board; Contact shareholders;

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

The Chair

Ensure adequate time
to discuss all agenda
items; promote a
culture of openness
and debate;

Enhance interaction
with investors,
shareholders, as
understood from the
Code; Job specification;
Ensure formal, full
induction for new
director joining on
board;

Leadership of board; report personally
in annual statements how the principles
relating to the role and effectiveness of the
board; Member of the Board Committees;
Meeting with non-executives and senior
independent director; Set board’s agenda;
regularly review director’s training and
development need; discuss governance and
strategy with major shareholders;

Effectiveness
leadership and
communication;
Ensure directors
receive accurate and
timely information;
Ensure views of
shareholders
communicate with
board;

CEO and
The Chair
relationship

Should not be the
same individual

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Not mentioned clearly in the Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Corporate
Secretary

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

All directors have
access to advice and
services; Appointed
and removed by board;

Ensure good flow of information among the Not mentioned
board and its committees and between
clearly in the Code
senior management and nonexecutive
directors; facilitate induction; advise the
board through chairman

Compliance
officer

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Not mentioned clearly in the Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Board of
Directors

appropriate balance
of skills,
experience,
independence and
knowledge of the
company Thinks
deeply, thoroughly
about tasks on a
continuing basis;
half of board is
non-executive,
independent directors;

Enhance interaction
with shareholders;
frankness and
openness in issues
discussion; update
and refresh skills and
knowledge

Set company’s strategic aims; leadership;
Supervise management, report to
shareholders; Support the CEO; Ensure
necessary financial and human resources in
place to meet co’s objectives;

In accordance to
laws, regulations
and shareholders;
Maintain mutual
respect and
openness; Act in the
best interests of the
company

decided by board
to be chairmen
and consult in
advance with
shareholders
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Executive
director

Continuing and high
quality efforts, time
allocation; update
and refresh skills and
knowledge

Formal and
transparent
remuneration policy

Not mentioned clearly in the Code

Maintain mutual
respect and
openness; Act in the
best interests of the
company

Understood from
the Code

Nonexecutive
director

Continuing and high
quality efforts, time
allocation;

update and refresh
skills and knowledge

Develop proposals on strategy; scrutinize
management performance; determine
appropriate remuneration for , appoint,
and remove executive directors;

Maintain mutual
respect and
openness; Act in the
best interests of the
company

Understood from
the Code

(Senior)
Independent
director

Continuing and high
quality efforts, time
allocation;

update and refresh
skills and knowledge

Member of the Board Committees; senior
acts as intermediary between chairmen,
board and shareholders

Act in the best
interests of the
company; A sounding
board;

CFO/Finance
Director

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Contact shareholders;

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Management
team

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Not mentioned clearly in the Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Supervisory
board

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Not mentioned clearly in the Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Internal
control

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Transparent
arrangements
between board’s
risk management
principles and auditor

Maintained by Board;
Review of financial, operational and
compliance controls conducted by board;

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Internal audit

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Effectiveness of Activities Monitored by
audit committee;

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

External audit Not mentioned clearly
in the Code

Relevant ethical
Policy of non audit services implemented
guidance on non-audit by audit committee;
services;

Disclosure and Formal, transparent
transparency procedure to appoint
the new director
to Board; CG states
main feature of risk
management and
internal control
relating to financial
reporting process;

Communicate by AGM
between Board and
investors; AGM Notice
sent to shareholders 20
days before meeting

Shareholders
and Minority
Stockholder

Enhance interaction
Remember the
with the board; mutual purpose of good
understanding of co’s corporate governance
objectives

Accountability A balanced and
understandable
assessment of
company’s position
and prospects

Nature of business
and risks understood
by Board

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

The Chairman interact with investors
Not mentioned
through annual report; annual report states clearly in the Code
how board operated and which decisions
taken by board and which delegated to
management

Appoint directors and auditors; Remember
the size and complexity of the co and risks
it faces;

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Annual re-election for all directors;
Maintain sound risk management and
internal control by Board

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Performed by the Board, CEO and
Chairmen, understood from the Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Encouraged for
small firms

Leadership

Clear division between Not mentioned clearly
operating the board
in the Code
and operating the
business

Note

The underlined part is describing some more works needed to be done for relevant subjects and parties. Smaller listed companies can ignore
some provisions.
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In Germany
Germany has lots of changes in their Code annually since 2007, 2008, 2009 and the latest
version in 2010 aims to make it, the governance system, understandable and transparent.
It includes roles of different stakeholders in setting the goals of its 2010 Code.
A short summary and evaluation of this revised Code is shown in the Exhibit 3.
Different from UK Code, the 2010 Code emphasizes the participation of employees in
the Board of Supervisory (SB).
Besides, it pays attention to analyze the operation of GM and how it adds value to the
company, as well as the involvement of financial service providers.
Another different point is the function of review MB compensation regularly is allocated to SB. The Code highlights the compensation oriented toward sustainable
growth of enterprise.
However, the CEO’s qualification and responsibilities are not well and clearly defined, in
regarding to the Chair’s duties. Additionally, another matter is the organization of the
Audit committee in the company. Though it provides a good description on the duties of
committee, it still had an overlap with SB or might probably cause confusion between the
roles of compliance and the roles of the audit. (see Exhibit 8).
In short summary, Strengths of the German 2010 Code are, but not limited to, analyzing roles of the supervisory Board in enterprise, as well as recommendations for proper
criteria of compensation structure, both for MB and SB. Though the Code mainly guides
listed corporations, it involves recommendations to non-listed firms as well.
Comparison between German and the UK Corporate governance standards
Based on the above information, we can see different stakeholders and related parties
when the Commission or Council tries to enhance its code. It is in the 2010 German
Code that the term “social market economy” is used in generating the Corporate Governance standards.
While, the 2010 UK Code take into account of roles of leadership, separated, and accountability.
Another advantage in the German 2010 Code is the criteria for pay out of compensation
of MB members noted with common level compared to peer companies.
On the contrary, the UK Code illustrates roles of The CEO, Chair in more details. While
Germany enhances roles of SB’s chair.
Another strong feature of the German Code is pointing Corporate Governance Report
to cover, in an understandable way, compensation system for MB members.
Next, German made a good point when it clarifies duties and roles of not only SB but also
MB. While UK Code put more emphasis on executive directors.
And Germany also mentions extra functions of SB such as its approval of extending
loans in its revised 2010 code (see Exhibit 3).
Both Codes has same “comply or explain” element as stated directly in the UK Code.
In German Code, it requires that the MB and SB has to comply with proper corporate
management. On the other hand, both Codes do not describe roles of Secretary and
Compliance officer in details.
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The 1st Establishment of a so-called Limited European Representative Corporate
Governance standards
With the selection of The United Kingdom and Germany as two European countries
(limited) which represent in the construction of general corporate governance principles
and standards, we build the below table with the following criteria:
Firstly, it includes contents that enable fi rm to encounter corporate governance issues after the corporate scandals and fi nancial crisis. It also functions as a summary
of general corporate governance standards from these two European representative
countries.
Therefore, we use the term “Limited European Representative Corporate governance
standards” to represent for the common criteria. The term “limited” here means the criteria mentioned below is better in the light of the author’s appraisal, which is considered
in the context that the financial crisis and the corporate scandals caused many errors in
the system of Corporate Governance in Europe. It is also constructed in the way that being the better understandable criteria.
TABLE C.1 – A summary of A Limited European Representative Corporate Governance
general standards
Subjects or
parties
Audit committee

Main quality factors
At least three independent nonexecutive directors, and one or two
members in smaller co.
Should not be the same individual

Sub quality factors

specialist knowledge and experience
in application of accounting principles
and internal control process
CEO and The Chair
Effectiveness leadership and
communication; Ensure views of
shareholders communicate with board;
Corporate
Ensure good connection and flow among Ensure directors receive accurate and
Secretary
the board and its committees and
timely information;
between senior management and nonexecutive directors;
Compliance officer N/A (for further research and
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
implementation)
Board of Directors cooperate closely to Supervisory Board
N/A (for further research and
(strategy) in writing and electronic;
implementation)
independently managing;
Independent
Continuing and high quality efforts;
N/A (for further research and
director
refresh skills and knowledge;
implementation)
Supervisory
Respect diversity; take necessary
Participation of selected employees
board to the
training;
Management
Supervisory to the Respect diversity; take necessary
N/A (for further research and
Board of Directors training;
implementation)
Internal control
Transparent arrangements between
N/A (for further research and
board’s risk management principles and implementation)
auditor
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Internal audit
External audit
Disclosure and
transparency
Shareholders

The corporation
as a whole entity
(enterprise)
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Effectiveness of Activities Monitored by
audit committee;
Policy of non audit services implemented
by audit committee;
Accounting standards reflect “true and
fair” view; Open discussion between
Board and Supervisor;
Mutual understanding company’s
objectives; Remember the size and
complexity of the co and risks it faces;
Explain how its actual business
practices consistent to the principles
and contribute to governance; Provide
necessary resources for developing its
directors’ knowledge and capabilities

N/A (for further research and
implementation)
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
Using Internet in communication with
investors and shareholders
Enhance communication with Board
and Chair
Directors acts in the best interests
of the company; equal shareholders
treatment

C.2 - Group 2 – Relative Good Corporate governance group analysis
During the financial crisis 1997-1998 and 2007-2009, France, Sweden and Denmark are
among good countries with little impacts from the crisis storm and have many improvements in their Corporate governance Codes.
France’s Corporate Governance standards analysis:
France has several movements in adjusting their Code of Corporate governance from
1997, 2001, 2003, 2008 and here we concentrate on its latest version, the 2010 AFG, socalled French, Code.
Good recommendations involved in the 2010 Code include, but not limited to, careful
attention to the shareholders’ rights and general meeting, in which video conference and
e-means can be used for distant communication. Also, it suggests a few criteria, in detail,
which enables shareholders to vote for a candidate in BD or SB.
Besides, it is more directly than other Codes that the Code states the Executives should
include the environmental and social policies of the company in their report delivered
to GM.
In addition to, it make, compared to other codes, another distinguished point of not supporting cross-management duties and cross-shareholdings in order to maintain transparency and independent managing.
Another minor point is the exclusion of CFO and CEO and Chair’s descriptions.
For a summary on corporate governance factors, please refer to the Exhibit 4.
In summary, the description of different types of compensation and clarifications of independence and free from conflicts of interest are among good sides in the French Code
2010 while it does not analyze well roles of compliance officer or CEO.
Sweden’s Good Corporate Governance principles analysis:
The Sweden Corporate Governance Board has modified the Code over years 2005, 2008,
2009 (consultation) and now, the 2010 version, with an attention to shareholders and
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board’s duties. (See Exhibit 9). It states the decision making made by simple majority
vote at the GM. Besides, there are three (3) decision making bodies mentioned, which
provides a better view than other Codes.
One of its advantages is the direction of making it applicable and provide clear norm for
good corporate governance in Swedish listed companies.
Different from the French Code, here, the CEO roles are presented. For example, CEO
must present issues outside the scope of day-to-day management to BD.
According to the code, the clarification of CG report such as division of tasks among BD
members is another good point.
Generally, The 2010 Sweden Code strengthens the roles of BD and shareholders in creating values for the company. And same as the UK Code, the 2010 Sweden Code provides a
comply or explain approach, which allows the company to select alternatives and explain
it. It is in the Code that it requires the BD composition suitable to appropriate development phase and the company’s operation. On the other hand, it still needs to clarify
the leadership of the Chair different from CEO and compliance officer’s roles for better
understanding.
Please see the Exhibit 7 for more information.
Danish’s Good Corporate Governance principles analysis:
The Danish Committee on CG has updated the new version, which is in compliance with
OECD’s principles, in April 2010 from previous ones, in 2008, 2003 and 2001, the original
one. Its purpose is to enhance practical tools and useful recommendations for companies.
It enables shareholders to facilitate their rights by giving their views and decision at GM.
And besides clarifying the duties of the chairmen, it also mentions another person, the
deputy chairman who is able to act in case the chairmen’s absence.
Different from Sweden Code in which it describes the independent director, the Danish recommendation clarifies the independent SGB, or Supreme governing body whose
members are elected by employees. Last but not least, it refers to a remuneration policy
which needs to indicate the reasons for remuneration.
In short, the Danish Code let the company decide whether to establish internal audit
and other important issues and it clearly describe two (2) governing bodies. However, it
would be better if it explains roles and relationship of CEO and compliance officer and
between the Chair and CEO.

5. COMPARISON
The 2010 French Code mentions several good points such as: electronic voting, clarifying
rights of shareholders and note them about right to regroup to send resolution at the GM
and a GM operation means of allowing answers to shareholders’ questions written on
co.’s web as a way to operate the GM, as well as criteria for voting. (see Exhibit 11). It also
mentions an executive committee which is regularly forgotten in other Codes.
Same as the French Code, 2010 Sweden Code emphasizes the role of shareholder’s meeting or GM and it encourages active involvement from shareholders. Besides, it clarifies
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roles of CEO in the aspect that he or she might be different from the BD’s Chair. It also
enhances the task of statutory auditor in examining whether BD or CEO carry out any
action resulting in liability for damages. Among its different points includes the introduction of board procedures.
On the other hand, the Danish 2010 CG Recommendation, which is influenced by British models of executives and non-executives, comes up with the structure of “supreme
and central governing body”. Different from the Sweden Code, the day to day management task is delivered to Board of Director, BD, not CEO.
Therefore, based on above analysis, here we try to build a set of common standards.
The 1st Establishment of a so-called relatively Good Corporate Governance standards
This following table is built with the consideration of comparative analysis of three (3)
selected above countries.
TABLE C.2 – A relatively Good Corporate Governance standards
Subjects or parties
Audit committee

Main quality factors
At least one third (1/3) free from
conflicts of interest;

CEO and The Chair

CEO Appointed, evaluated and
dismissed by BD, GM and Chair;
Separated functions;
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
Day to day management; Diversity
of boards in education, gender,
background;

Corporate Secretary
Compliance officer
Board of Directors

Independent director

Supervisory board to the
Management
Supervisory to the Board
of Directors
Internal control
Internal audit

External audit

Independent opinion on tasks
covered; Acquire knowledge of
operation and market;
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
ensures high standard information
sent to public
Adequacy of Internal control ensured
by BD;
Independent, competent and
thorough; Audit report in accordance
with relevant legislation;
Audit report in accordance with
relevant legislation;

Sub quality factors
Majority independent of
management, with at least one (1)
independent of major shareholders;
Chair ensure BD’s work wellorganized and efficiently
conducted;
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
No fewer than three (3) members;
at least two (2) members be
independent of company’s major
shareholders;
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
Act in the best interests of company
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
Not be governed by Board or
executive MGT;
Independent, competent and
thorough

D. TRAN NGOC HUY | THE BACKBONE OF EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS ...

Disclosure and
transparency
Shareholders
The corporation as a
whole entity

cross-management duties in
contradiction with transparency and
independent decision making;
Decide on appropriation of profits
and losses; Elect board and auditor;
Be interested in CSR
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Clear and understandable
remuneration policy;
right to submit resolution; Wellinformed of the company situation;
Maintain good relationships with
stakeholders;

D.3 - The 1st Establishment of a so-called European Limited Comparative Corporate
Governance standards
Comparison of corporate governance standards between <D.1> and <D.2> group
Before we come to set up a set of general limited standards of corporate governance, we
need to review the standards combined in the previous two (2) groups
The advantages of European Representative Corporate Governance standards are, but
not limited to, clarifications roles between Chair and CEO, and secretary and views from
the corporation as the entity.
On the contrary, the relative Good Corporate Governance Group standards states board
of directors’ tasks and its operation, as well roles of the chairmen.
A so-called European Limited Comparative Corporate Governance Set of standards
Based on the 1st Establishment of a so-called relative Good Corporate Governance
standards and The 1st Establishment of a European Representative Corporate Governance standards (above establishments), we consider to build comparative standards for a
limited European Corporate Governance system.
TABLE C.3 - The European Limited Comparative Corporate Governance standards
Subjects or parties
Audit committee

Main quality factors
with specialist knowledge and
experience in application of
accounting principles and internal
control process
Nominating committee
evaluate the balance of skills,
experience, independence and
knowledge on the board; process to
nominate board;
Numeration or
Numeration policies to attract and
Compensation Committee retain competent members;
CEO and The Chair
Effectiveness leadership and
communication; Ensure views of
shareholders communicate with
board;
CFO
N/A (for further research and
implementation)
Corporate Secretary
Ensure good connection and timely
flow among the board and its
committees and between senior
management and non-executive
directors;

Sub quality factors
Majority independent of
management, with at least one (1)
independent of major shareholders;
Evaluate skills, knowledge of
governing bodies, BD members;

Propose decisions electoral and
numeration matters to GM;
CEO Appointed, evaluated and
dismissed by BD, GM and Chair;

N/A (for further research and
implementation)

228

Compliance officer
Board of Directors or
Management Board

Independent director
Supervisory board to the
Management
Supervisory to the Board
of Directors
Internal control

Internal audit

External audit
Disclosure and
transparency
Shareholders
Stakeholders

Accountability
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N/A (for further research and
implementation)
cooperate closely to Supervisory
Board (strategy) in writing and
electronic; independently managing;
day to day management;
Continuing and high quality efforts;
refresh skills and knowledge;
Respect diversity; take necessary
training;
Respect diversity; take necessary
training;
Transparent arrangements between
board’s risk management principles
and auditor
Effectiveness of Activities Monitored
by audit committee; Audit report in
accordance with relevant legislation;
Independent, competent and
thorough
Accounting standards reflect “true
and fair” view; Open discussion
between Board and Supervisor;
right to submit resolution; Wellinformed of the company situation;
Maintain satisfactory engagement
between Board and investors;

N/A (for further research and
implementation)
Diversity of boards in education,
gender, background, experience;

Continuing and high quality efforts;
refresh skills and knowledge;

ensures high standard information
sent to public
Review of financial, operational and
compliance controls conducted by
board;
Independent, competent and
thorough
Policy of non audit services
implemented by audit committee;
Clear and understandable
remuneration policy; Using Internet
or electronic GM;
Elect members of Supervisory
Board and auditors;
stock options’ resolution of
executives different from that of
employees
BD ensures independent
judgement;
Belongs to Chair, CEO, SGB and SB

Nature of business and risks
understood by Board;
Leadership
Separate and clearly descriptions of
leading business operation different
from leading board
The corporation as a
Business is a going concern; Explain
Co.’s sustainable value creation in
whole entity
how its actual business practices
conformity with a social market
consistent to the principles and
economy approach
contribute to governance; Provide
necessary resources for developing its
directors’ knowledge and capabilities
The Code
Take an ‘’Explain or Comply and
N/A (for further research and
understandable” approach
implementation)
(Note: source are based on corporate governance standards of group <D.1> and <D.2> and the appraisal of
these standards)

6. CONCLUSION
Among several key corporate governance issues is the setting of a compensation policy,
and therefore, a sound organization of compensation and numeration committee. As we
see from Exhibit 10, though guidelines for compensation pay out are referred to, the op-
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eration of numeration committee may be differently organized to achieve sound results
(see our above analysis and table), or stated clearly proper criteria as in German Code. To
do this, the Code should have certain characteristics, so-called Code’s backbone, that we
summarize above such as an “explain and understandable” attribute.
While the Sweden 2010 Code tries to create good and clear descriptions of roles which
are different among owners, board and management. And the Danish Code leaves an
optional decision for Supreme governing body of the company on issues of establishing
internal audit function. Besides, the UK and France Code also identify different and
separated roles and functions between CEO and the Chair.
In consideration of corporate governance issues analyzed in the previous sessions, we
proposed the main and sub quality factors in this paper a set of general corporate governance standards in a limited European model with selected countries. It has some
implications for further research and proper recommendations to relevant government
and organizations. Please see Exhibit 5.
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GLOSSARY AND NOTES
AGM
AFG
CGB
GM
AGM
CG
DG
SB
BD
SGB
CGB
CEO
CFO
MB
AC
CNC
NC
SEC
MGT
BM
AR
IA
RM
IC

Annual General Meeting, (and GM, in which can be facilitated by Internet tools)
Association Francaise de la Gestion financiere
Corporate Governance Board
General Meeting (see above) or Shareholders’ Meeting
Annual General Meeting
Corporate Governance
Directorates Governance
Supervisory Board
Board of Directors
Supreme Governing Body (SB and BD)
Central Governing Body (SB and BD)
Chief Executive Officer, or Chief Executive
Chief Financial Officer, or Finance Director
Management Board
Audit Committee
Compensation or Numeration Committee
Nominating Committee
The Securities and Exchange Commission
Management
Board Meeting
Annual Report
Internal Audit
Risk Management
Internal Control
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EXHIBIT 1 – Changes in Company Law and Regulations recently
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EXHIBIT 2 – The Model of Construction of A So-Called Comparative European corporate
governance standards

EXHIBIT 3 – Evaluation of German 2010 Code Corporate Governance
Subjects or parties Main quality factors

Sub quality factors

Responsibilities

Objectives

Audit committee

Set up by SB; chairman
with specialist knowledge
and experience in
application of accounting
principles and internal
control process

The chairman
different from
Chairman of SB

Examine consolidate financial
statements; as understood from
the Code; handles issues of risk
management, accounting and
compliance;

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Nomination
committee

Formed by SB;

Compose Exclusively
of shareholders’
representatives

Not mentioned clearly in the
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Compensation
or Remuneration
committee

Belong to the SB, , as
understood from the Code

Belong to the SB, ,
as understood from
the Code

Belong to the SB, , as understood Belong to the SB, ,
from the Code
as understood from
the Code

CEO

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

The Chair

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code, or the chair of SB, as
understood from the Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

CEO and The Chair
relationship

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Corporate Secretary

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Compliance officer

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Board of Directors

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly A single body;
in the Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Note

Possible
Alternative, by
European Company
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Executive director

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Non-executive
director

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Independent
director

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

CFO

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Management team
(Board)

Inform to SB important
matters: business
development, risk
management

cooperate closely
to SB (strategy)
in writing and
electronic;
independently
managing; age limit;

Managing enterprise; Submit
financial statements to GM;
provide sufficient information
to SB;

Good corporate
governance; Act in
the best interests
of company, as
understood from
the Code

A Chairman of MGT
Board

Supervisory board

Members of Supervisory
Board elected by
shareholders; cooperate
closely to Management
Board

one-third (1/3) or
one half (1/2) are
employees; respect
diversity; take
necessary training;
age limit;

Appoint, supervise Management
Board; decisions of fundamental
importance of enterprise
(changes of asset, earnings
situation); approve extending
loans to members of MB and
SB; review MB compensation
system; Examine consolidate
financial statements;

Good corporate
governance;
appropriate
compensation
levels; Act in the
best interests
of company, as
understood from
the Code

A Chairman of
Supervisory Board
is a shareholders’
representative in
enterprise with
more than 2000
employees

Internal control

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Risk management and risk
in the Code
controlling ensured by MB

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Internal audit

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Not mentioned clearly in the
in the Code
Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

External audit

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Send statement to SB or
in the Code
AC about where and which
business, financial and personal
relationship exist between
auditor and executives; mainly
contact with SB;

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Disclosure and
transparency

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Open discussion
between MB and
SB; Internet for
communication
with investors and
shareholders

Accounting standards reflect
Not mentioned
“true and fair” view; MB discloses clearly in the Code
conflicts of interests to SB;
insider information disclosed by
MB; interim, half year, quarterly
and annual financial reports
informed to shareholders;

Shareholders and
Not mentioned clearly in
Minority Stockholder the Code

Send notification
of GM by electronic
means; use Internet
for GM;

Elect members of Supervisory
Not mentioned
Board and auditors; one vote
clearly in the Code
each share; resolve appropriation
of net income at GM, intercompany agreement;

Accountability

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Belongs to MB and SB, as
in the Code
understood from the Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Leadership

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code

Not mentioned clearly Belongs to MB and SB, as
in the Code
understood from the Code

Not mentioned
clearly in the Code

Note

The underlined part is describing some more works needed to be done for relevant subjects and parties. Either dual-board or single
board can be successful with intensive interaction.

No share carry
multi votes
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EXHIBIT 4 – Evaluation of French Code of CG 2010
Subjects or parties

Main quality factors

Sub quality factors

Responsibilities

Objectives

Note

Audit committee

At least one third (1/3)
free from conflicts of
interest;

One (1) BD or SB member
with Financial and
accounting expertise;

Risk analysis; Assessment
of external auditor’s work;
control finance and accounting
information;

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

There is a
chairman

Nomination
committee

At least three (3)
members of BD or SB

At least one third (1/3) free
from conflicts of interest

Appoint board members,
directors; join in assessment of
board’s performance

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Compensation
or Remuneration
committee

Chairperson and
majority of members
free from conflicts of
interest

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Design compensation types with
fixed and variable pay; examine
compensation of executives;

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

CEO

Separated from the
chair;

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

The Chair

Separated from the CEO;

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Report internal control
procedures to GM; full discretion
to vote as proxy;

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

CEO and The Chair
relationship

Separated functions;

Free conflicts of interest lead Not mentioned clearly from
director appointed if they
the Code
are same

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Corporate Secretary

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Compliance officer

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Board of Directors

Diversity of boards in
education, gender,
background; board
members with executive
duties outside limited
to two and five for nonexecutive directorships;

Directors representing
employee shareholders’
nominated by shareholders;
regular board member
training; one third (1/3) of
board free from conflicts
of interest

Answer shareholders in GM
how they function; supervise
compensation decision making;
formal annual assessment of
board’s performance;

Determine future of
company; board’s
strategy and
action consistent
with sustainable
development of
the co.;

Executive/
Representative
director

Limited to two for nonexecutive directorships
in BD

Not in favor of executives
with cross-management
duties and crossshareholdings;

Inform to GM key issues: co.’s
medium and long term strategy,
debt and dividend distribution
policy; attending GM; keep large
amount of company shares or
stock options (at risk); fully
delegate their shareholdings’
management;

Non-executive
director

Limited to five for nonexecutive directorships
in BD

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

There is
non-executive
chairperson;

Independent director

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Independent judgement

Be informed about the
rights and duties for their
position;

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

As understood
from the Code

CFO

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Management
and employees
may not be
member

There is an
executive
committee, as
understood
from The Code
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Management team

Investment manager be
independent;

Documents published in
advance of board meetings

Supply BD with information
useful for his or her duties
(strategy, compensation);

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Supervisory for the
board

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

supervise compensation decision
making; ensures high standard
information sent to public

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Supervisory for the
managers

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Internal control

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Regular communication
between board head and
risk depart.’s head

Procedures Reported in GM by
the chairperson of the Board; AC
oversight it;

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Internal or statutory
audit

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

External audit

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Assessment made by AC;

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Disclosure and
transparency

Transparent
cross-management duties
compensation; Avoid use and cross-shareholdings
of ambiguous language; in contradiction with
transparencyand
independent decision
making;

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Shareholders and
Minority Stockholder

As many shareholders
attending GM as
possible;

GM can dismiss BD or SB;
Not mentioned
summary and full reports needed clearly from the
in GM; right to submit resolution; Code
not in favor of anti takeover
measures (minority shareholders’
interests);

Accountability

Board ensures
Board noted about their
independent judgement; duties and rights;

SB and BD ensures high standard
information sent to public

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Leadership

Not mentioned clearly
from the Code

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code

Not mentioned
clearly from the
Code

Note

The underlined part is describing some more works needed to be done for relevant subjects and parties.

they be informed as soon as
possible; can use electronic
means or videoconference
for GM;

Not mentioned clearly from
the Code
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As understood
from the Code
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EXHIBIT 5 – Three (3) Factors Corporate Governance Decision Making model in The 2010
Sweden CG principles

(source: 2010 Sweden Code and Company Acts)

EXHIBIT 6 – Corporate governance parties

(Source: Loh Leong Hua & Ragayah Haji Matzin, Corporate Governance: Theory and some insights into the
Malaysian Practice, 2007)
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EXHIBIT 7 – Evaluation of Sweden Corporate Governance Principles 2010
Subjects or parties Main quality factors

Sub quality factors

Audit committee

No fewer than three (3)
members;

Majority independent
Procedures written by board, if
of management, with at applicable;
least one (1) independent
of major shareholders;

Responsibilities

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Objectives

Nomination
committee

At least three (3)
members, one is
committee chair;

At least one (1) member
be independent of largest
shareholders; can have BD
member;

Nominate a chair for GM;
Propose decisions electoral
and numeration matters to GM;
Propose candidates for the post of
chair, BD member;

Ensure the co.’s
has access to the
competence at
appropriate cost;

Compensation
or Remuneration
committee

BD chair may be
remuneration’s chair;

Not mentioned clearly n
the Code;

Prepare principles of
remuneration; monitor and
evaluate remuneration programs;

Not mentioned clearly n
the Code;

CEO

Appointed, evaluated
and dismissed by BD;

Not mentioned clearly in
May be member of BD but One key decision making body;
not BD’s chair;
Charge of liability decided by GM; the Code;
day-to-day MGT; Obliged to follow
BD’s instructions; right to attend
and speak at BM; Evaluated by BD;

The Chair

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Ensure BD update and
develop its knowledge
from co.’s operation;

Organize and lead work of board;
ensure new BD member receive
training; in consultation with CEO;

CEO and The Chair
relationship

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in the Code; Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Corporate Secretary

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in the Code; Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Compliance officer

Not mentioned clearly n Not mentioned clearly n
the Code;
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly n the Code;

Not mentioned clearly n
the Code;

Board of Directors

No fewer than three
(3) members; at least
two (2) members
be independent of
company’s major
shareholders;

Delegate tasks to
individuals or non
member of boar; written
Rules of Procedure;
Devote necessary time
and care;

One key decision making body;
Board fee and Charge of liability
decided by GM; Organization and
business management duties;
May delegate decision making to
committee; written instructions
to CEO; guidelines to govern co.’s
ethical conduct;

Ensure external
communication open,
accurate and reliable
and relevant; ensure
satisfactory process
of monitoring co.’s
compliance with laws;

Executive/
Representative
director

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in the Code; Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Non-executive
director

Engaged entirely /
predominantly in board

Devote necessary time
and care;

Independent opinion on matter
covered; Acquire knowledge of
operation and market;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Independent director Whether he/she has
significant business
relationship with
company;

Whether has been CEO
or employee or auditor;
Devote necessary time
and care;

Independent opinion on matter
covered; Acquire knowledge of
operation and market;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

CFO

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in the Code; Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;;

Management team

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

No member of executive
MGT is board member;

Not mentioned clearly n the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Supervisory for the
board

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

The committees, as understood
from the Code

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Supervisory for the
managers

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in the Code; Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Note

Ensure BD’s work wellThe chair of
organized and efficiently the BD
conducted;

As
understood
from the
Code;
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Internal control

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Internal or statutory
audit

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Adequacy of Internal control
ensured by BD;

Company’s financial
reports in accordance
with legislation and
accounting standards;

Not be governed by
Review MGT of board
Board or executive MGT; and CEO;

Appointed by GM; be a controlling
body; Examine accounting
practices; report to owners at GM;

Audit report in
accordance with
relevant legislation;
whether AR reflects
accurate co.’s position

External audit

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Auditor fess decided by GM;

Not mentioned clearly in Understood
the Code;
from The
Code

Disclosure and
transparency

Minutes of GM posted
on web; formally and
openly remuneration
processes;

GM meeting information
posted on web in
conjunction with 3rd
quarter report;

Announce nomination committee Create maximize
members’ names on web; Post CG transparency to
report on co.’s website;
shareholders, capital
market and society;

Shareholders and
GM held in 6 months of
Minority Stockholder fiscal year end;

Active shareholders’
participation; major
shareholders hold 10% or
more share votes

A healthy balance of
GM is One key decision making
power between board,
body; Vote by proxy or by no
owner and executives;
of shares owned; Decide on
appropriation of profits and losses;
Elect board and auditor;

Accountability

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in the Code; Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Leadership

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

By the BD, as understood from
the Code;

Note

The underlined part is describing some more works needed to be done for relevant subjects and parties.

Minority
Shareholders
Protection
by The
Company
Acts

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

EXHIBIT 8 – Summary of Key Overlaps in the UK Code of Corporate Governance
Disclosure and Transparency rules
D.T.R 7.1.1.R
D.T.R 7.2.5.R

2010 Code
Provision C.3.1
Provision C.2.1

EXHIBIT 9 – Summary of Key Changes in the Sweden 2010 Code of Corporate Governance
Items
Internal Audit
Internal Control
(Source: Sweden Code 2010)

2010 Code
Requirement to explain lack of internal audit
(removed)
Production of an internal controls report, rule 7.4

D. TRAN NGOC HUY | THE BACKBONE OF EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS ...

239

EXHIBIT 10 – Some Sound Compensation Policies
Items
Factors of pay out

Recommendation
Payout of compensation incentives should be based on risk-adjusted
and cost of capitaladjusted profit and phased, where possible, to
coincide with the risk time horizon of such profit. (III)
Factors of pay out
Incentive compensation should have a component reflecting the
impact of business unit’s returns on the overall value of related
business groups and the organisation as a whole. (IV)
Transparency of pay out
The approach, principles and objectives of compensation incentives
should be transparent to stakeholders. (VI)
(Source: Institute of International Finance (2008b), Final Report of the IIF Committee on Market Best Practices: Principles of Conduct and Best Practice Recommendations, Washington, D.C).

EXHIBIT 11 – Summary of Criteria when shareholders vote on BD or SB member in the
AFG Code of Corporate Governance
Criteria
CV
Free of Conflict of interest

Note
Current functions, appointment
relationship between the company where the candidate is principally
employed and the company he/she is a candidate.

EXHIBIT 12 – Evaluation of Danish Recommendation on Corporate Governance 2010
Subjects or parties

Main quality factors

Sub quality factors

Responsibilities

Objectives

Note

Audit committee (Board
committees)

Not sufficient if
SGB acts as audit
committee;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Monitor and report to SGB on
accounting and risk matters;

Increase efficiency and
improve quality of the
SGB’s work

Understood
as Board
Committees,
from the Code

Nomination committee

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Established by SGB;

Describes qualifications of
two (2) governing bodies;
Evaluate skills, knowledge of
governing bodies members;
report to SGB;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Compensation or
Remuneration committee

Not consult with the
Established by SGB;
same external advisers
as BD;

Proposals for remuneration
policy;

Attract and retain
competent members;

CEO

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

The Chair

Evaluated by different
person;

Efficient
communication
between SGB and BD
and sharehodelrs;

Scheduling of meeting for the Ensure knowledge
year; Ensure members update and skills of individual
knowledge of the co.;
member used in the best
manner for the co.;

CEO and The Chair
relationship

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Corporate Secretary

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Compliance officer

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;
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Board of Directors (the
supreme and the central )

SGB assess whether
its composition and
skills of its members
reflects, or needed to
be update, demands
posed by the co.

Know shareholders’
attitude, interests and
views; independent
SGB;

Day to day management;
supervise the executive board;
Evaluate whether capital
structure is in interests of
shareholders; SGB approve
procedures for BD; Maintain
overall MGT and control;
Identify most important
business risks;

Ensure ongoing
communication with
shareholders; Ensure
follow-up on the co.’s
strategic goals; Ensure
financial report in
accordance with
current legislation and
applicable standards;

Italic words for
the BD in central
governing body

Executive/Representative
director

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

All be present at GM;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

As understood
from the Code

Non-executive director

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

All be present at GM;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

As understood
from the Code

Independent director

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Mentioned in independent
SGB, as understood from
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

CFO

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Management team

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Supervisory for the board

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

A body involved in SGB
and CGB;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Supervisory for the
managers

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Internal control (risk
committee)

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

SGB decided whether there is Effective RM or IC;
a need for risk committee

Internal or statutory audit

Independent,
competent and
thorough

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

AC decides whether there is a Not mentioned clearly in
need for Internal Audit;
the Code;

As understood
from the Code

External audit

Independent,
competent and
thorough

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

As understood
from the Code

Disclosure and
transparency

Openness and
transparency
of important
remuneration matters;
risk management
included in annual
reports;

No. of SGB’s Meetings
and some personal
information disclosed
in annual report;

Annual report disclose
special skills of SGB member;
Clear and understandable
remuneration policy;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Shareholders and Minority
Stockholder

Well-informed of the
company situation;

Make it easy for
dialogue with
management

The ultimate decision
maker (public co.); exercise
rights at GM; GM as forum
for communication and
discussion; remuneration
policy accepted by GM;

Co. To be competitive
and value-added;

Minority
Shareholders
Protection by
The Company
Acts

Accountability

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

As understood
from the Code

Leadership

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

Not mentioned clearly
in the Code;

SGB be responsible for;

Not mentioned clearly in
the Code;

Note

The underlined part is describing some more works needed to be done for relevant subjects and parties. Its 2010 involves mainly
recommendation .

